I seem to have stumbled
across some significant inconsistencies in my thinking that I am, at least for
the moment, incapable of reconciling.
When discussing the moral status of nonhuman animals, I tend to be
attracted to the direct but unequal
theories. I see all sentient beings,
capable of suffering, as possessing some inherent
value. I see it as the duty of moral
agents to avoid causing the suffering of such beings whenever possible. However, as I’ve said before, I do tend to
think that inherent value can exist
on an incremental scale. I therefore
find it possible to differentiate between the value attributed to human beings
and the value of nonhuman animals.
I usually justify this view by pointing to the mental
capacities unique to humans, and hence the more profound nature of our
subjective experience. But I am unable
to use this rationale when faced with the Argument from Marginal Cases. Even forgetting animals for the moment, I
seem to be justifying the idea that human beings can be valued on a sliding
scale according to their mental capacities.
Given that I adamantly believe in the moral equality of all human
beings, regardless of any arbitrary differences, I have apparently painted
myself into a bit of a corner.
It seems entirely possible that I have just been
attempting to rationalize the fact that, when pressed, I simply value human
beings more than animals.
I feel as if Im caught in a similar problem. I too believe that regardless of arbitrary differences in humans, we should be treated as equals. When it comes to animals however, I do seem to sometimes favor the opinion of choosing to save humans over animals based on the idea of them having lesser mental abilities. Thanks for helping to vocalize what I was struggling with too!
ReplyDeleteSpeciesism is characterized by assigning different rights and value to different species of animals based on morally irrelevant differences. Saying that humans are, in general, more valuable than dogs because humans have higher mental capacities is not speciesist. Saying that humans are better than dogs because humans walk on two legs, or rather, simply because they are human is speciesist.
DeleteA related problem, as you pointed out, involves not recognizing that there are no abilities that all humans have that most animals do not have; it's not speciesist, it's just factually inaccurate. The argument from marginal cases brings this particular point out. It would, I think, be speciesist to say that sentience only matter when it is possessed to the extent that humans have and that anything less than that is useless or irrelevant, because it involves arbitrarily assigning a point of relevance based on species.
I don't know if that helps any. I certainly think that most human lives are worth more than most animals lives, and I don't think that's speciesist.
I'm not sure if we humans will ever have a full complete grasp of nonhuman animal value. There are another community unto themselves with different biological functions and different capacities. Of course, nonhuman animals have all sorts of value to individuals but we will never know them totally.
ReplyDelete