Ideally, we like to think of
ethics as somehow consisting only of rational arguments. It generally brings about discomfort and
distaste when anything smelling of sentiment comes into play. Yet, as Brody’s argument points out, there
are many cases where emotional bonds play very important roles in moral
decisions.
The
parent/child relationship is an obvious case.
In fact, it is so obvious that in class it was suggested we discuss
scenarios involving siblings instead (which almost seems to prove the point in
the first place). So, consider a
drowning scenario where you have to choose between saving a stranger or a
sibling (or even just a friend). Is
there really anyone that truly believes they would flip a coin so as to avoid
any emotional bias from creeping into their ethical decision-making? The fact is you are more emotionally attached
to one person, and would automatically
decide to save that person. It is a
purely sentimental decision that is so universally understandable that no one
could ever blame someone for making it.
Any attempt to give a logical, philosophical explanation would just be a
rationalization after the fact.
Extreme
hypothetical scenarios aside, I suppose the point is that (much to the chagrin
of many philosophers) human emotions and relationships will always play a
significant role in moral decisions. Rational
argument is incredibly important. It is
a powerful check on the dubious nature of emotional behavior. But we are emotional creatures, and will
never be purely rational. True, some
feelings are toxic and dangerous, and should not be used to justify despicable
behavior. But some human sentiments
(love, compassion, empathy, solidarity) are extraordinarily positive tools, and
are arguably the basis for our desire to be moral in the first place. To disregard these because they are not
derived from rational thought processes seems like throwing the baby out with
the bathwater.
I do
not necessarily agree with Brody’s discounting argument entirely, and I know
that I have not mentioned animals at all.
It seems to me, however, that given a drowning scenario involving a
human and a nonhuman animal, most people would save the human without thinking
twice. Instead of searching for some
theoretical rationalization after the fact, Brody’s argument at least seems to
acknowledge that this could be based
solely on sentiment, and that does not necessarily make it wrong. As to coming up with a particular discounting
rate, or discussing how this relates to animal research is, perhaps, another
issue.
