Response to Sebastian's "Humanizing Animals"

            In short, yes, we are always at risk of anthropomorphizing animals.  It is also well within the realm of possibility that we overdue it at times.  However, in a sense, we have no real choice.  We only have access to one type of consciousness, i.e. our own.  In speculating about the consciousness of other species, we are forced to do so in ways that relate to our own experience.  I agree with you that it is possible that animals have entirely different experiences than we do.  And that is, perhaps, important to always keep in mind.  Yet, as Bermond pointed out, assuming that a being’s consciousness is somehow qualitatively different from our own makes it impossible to discuss.  That we can only discuss consciousness as it relates to our own experience is indeed a limitation, but arguably one we cannot avoid.

To Veg, or Not to Veg

            I am not a vegetarian, although in recent years I have been leaning increasingly in that direction.  I generally find the basic argument (as offered by James Rachels, for example) pretty convincing.  If we do not need to kill animals for food, and can live perfectly healthy lives without doing so, then we should not be killing animals for food.  In the face of arguments such as this, I concede that my not being a vegetarian can only be explained by my own weakness and lack of will power.

            However, arguments such as Kathryn Paxton George’s also give me some pause.  She points out that the nutritional needs of women, children, the elderly, and people in “developing societies” are not so easily reconciled with the “basic argument.”  An unequal burden is placed on different people for seemingly arbitrary reasons.

            Admittedly this says next to nothing about my own diet (seeing as I am an adult male living in a wealthy society).  Yet she does seem to bring into question the idea that strict vegetarianism is a universal moral imperative.  Should it be seen in more relative terms, depending on an individual’s particular situation?  Without question, there is no justification for factory farming and the cruelty discussed in Part Four of the text.  Boycotting these industries is absolutely a moral necessity, and no doubt meat consumption would be greatly reduced as a result.  But I often wonder if eliminating meat-eating altogether is reasonable, or necessary. While I linger on the fence, I do agree with Rollin’s conclusion:  “if we are to use animals for our benefit, it is morally incumbent upon us to make sure that they benefit as well, by at least living decent lives, not lives of misery, fear, and pain.”