Devious Apes

            Toward the end of his argument, Bermond (citing others such as Dennet) suggests, “the original function of consciousness was not social progress, but selfishness and deceit” (108).  The idea being that consciousness, and its subsequent emotional experiences, had to serve some sort of evolutionary purpose.  It only makes sense if it emerged along with higher order brain functions such as long-term planning, secret keeping, and understanding the demands of a complex social environment.  When self-consciousness emerged, it allowed our ancestors to speculate about the consciousness of others, and therefore made it possible to manipulate them.

            Upon further reflection this is not all that surprising, but still somewhat unsettling.  If the first seeds of self-awareness, and therefore all the higher cognitive capacities associated with humanity, emerged in order to gain advantage via deception and manipulation, what does that say about human nature?  At our core, are we all just sneaky, misleading, and selfish creatures?  Or is it possible that capacities for empathy, compassion, and real acts of altruism emerged as consciousness developed further?  I’m not really sure what I think, and I realize this is not entirely relevant to animal ethics, but I found it interesting nonetheless.    

Response to “Q&A 1, First Answer” by Avery S. Finnivan

            I agree that Cohen’s argument (at least the excerpt that we read) seems to lead to the conclusion that human beings who are not moral agents have no more value than trees, and therefore have no rights.  I also agree that the most likely response to this criticism would entail the idea of potential, and that such an argument is not entirely satisfying.  However, I see the problem slightly differently. 

            If you will allow me to put the abortion argument aside (as I see your point and think it is a good one), I do think that the argument from potentiality makes some sense in the case of human children.  I do not think that knowledge of the future is required in order to see the potential for moral agency as having value in itself.  The inherent value of a moral agent is not dependent on them behaving morally, or whether their actions bring about positive consequences.  It is inherent in the fact that they possess the requisite capacities.  I see the value associated with potential as similarly unconditional.  Given that every moral agent was once a child with nothing but the potential for agency, it seems reasonable to suggest that they always had the inherent value, but that the responsibility of agency came on gradually.

            That being said, I agree that this argument only applies to children who really do have the potential for moral agency.  It says absolutely nothing about those human beings who lack that potential, such as the mentally disabled.  This is where Cohen’s argument is most vulnerable.  Although I think the argument from potentiality would allow him to squeeze ordinary children into his circle of friends, he would still essentially be arguing that the mentally disabled (among others) have no rights. 

Am I a Closet Speciesist?

            I seem to have stumbled across some significant inconsistencies in my thinking that I am, at least for the moment, incapable of reconciling.  When discussing the moral status of nonhuman animals, I tend to be attracted to the direct but unequal theories.  I see all sentient beings, capable of suffering, as possessing some inherent value.  I see it as the duty of moral agents to avoid causing the suffering of such beings whenever possible.  However, as I’ve said before, I do tend to think that inherent value can exist on an incremental scale.  I therefore find it possible to differentiate between the value attributed to human beings and the value of nonhuman animals.

            I usually justify this view by pointing to the mental capacities unique to humans, and hence the more profound nature of our subjective experience.  But I am unable to use this rationale when faced with the Argument from Marginal Cases.  Even forgetting animals for the moment, I seem to be justifying the idea that human beings can be valued on a sliding scale according to their mental capacities.  Given that I adamantly believe in the moral equality of all human beings, regardless of any arbitrary differences, I have apparently painted myself into a bit of a corner.

            It seems entirely possible that I have just been attempting to rationalize the fact that, when pressed, I simply value human beings more than animals.