Zoos/Museums - Animals/Art

            Another recent conversation in class that sparked my interest had to do with comparing zoos and aquariums with art museums.  The discussion centered around the idea that, in reality, zoos have very little educational value.  Most people pass through zoos simply looking for amusement, and really learn next to nothing.  Beyond that, it can even be argued that if people learn anything, it has to do with developing a corrupted sense of humankind’s relationship to the natural world.

            The description of people wandering from exhibit to exhibit without much thought prompted a comparison to art museums.  It was then asked whether it could be argued that art museums similarly have no educational or cultural value.  Although I think it is an interesting question, I do not think it is a fair comparison.  Zoos and art museums are different in significant ways, particularly as it concerns the purpose of that which is being exhibited.

            There is sense of injustice associated with zoos because wild animals are being placed on display for the amusement (or supposedly the education) of humans.  These animals have been removed from their natural environments, and deprived of the freedom to live their lives in a manner that is natural to them.  The purpose of a living thing is certainly not to be locked in a cage for the entertainment of others.

            However, the manner in which museums place art on display for public viewing is very much in line with the purpose of the art itself.  Arguably (at least for most artists), exhibition is a major motivating factor for the creation of art in the first place.  Paintings, for example, are meant to be hung on walls, observed, experienced, and interpreted by others.  If one takes issue with the overly formal and/or saturated environment, those are, perhaps, fair criticisms.  However, it goes too far to suggest that displaying art for public viewing in such a manner has no educational or cultural value.  What one takes away from such an experience is certainly dependent on the individual.  But there is surely no harm being done, and the net outcome could only be assessed as positive.              

Hunting as Fair Game?

            Recently there was an interesting discussion in class in regards to the moral implications of hunting, particularly hunting as “sport.”  Generally, most people seem willing to accept hunting in so far as it necessary.  That is to say, that if one needs to hunt and kill an animal in order to survive or support one’s family, then it is considered morally permissible to do so.  However, “sport” hunting is considered highly controversial due to the fact that it does not seem to be necessary.  Arguments have been made in regards to hunters’ contributions to maintaining sustainable populations and the like.  However, that is not the aspect of the discussion that caught my attention.

            At one point, it was suggested that hunting (presumably as sport) is wrong because it is not a “fair fight,” the implication being that the wrongness is located in the fact that humans have guns, putting them at a significant advantage.  The question was then raised as to whether or not hunting would be considered more acceptable if humans were forced to hunt with more primitive weapons (or even their bare hands).

            There is of course the argument that humans’ use of technology is perfectly natural, and therefore legitimate in any “contest” between humans and nonhuman animals.  However, I believe this misses the point.  If sport hunting is wrong, it is because it involves the unnecessary killing of an animal, solely for the amusement of the hunter.  In my opinion, the immorality has nothing to do with the fairness of the fight.  If unnecessarily killing wildlife is wrong in and of itself, why should the advanced nature of the technology being used matter, aside from its ability to potentially limit the suffering of the animal being killed?  Would it really be better to hit a deer in the head with a rock, or in the abdomen with a spear, than to execute a relatively clean kill shot with a high-powered rifle, just because it is more challenging?  Advanced hunting technology is morally irrelevant, other than the fact that it clearly provides hunters with the opportunity to be more efficient and limit the suffering involved in the kill.

Losing Touch?

            I do not mean to dwell on the same subject matter, but a recent discussion in class seemed extremely relevant to the point I tried to make in my previous post.  We were discussing a scenario involving a human child in danger of being attacked by a wolf (presumably as prey), and whether or not one would be morally justified, or obligated, to intervene. 

I understand that an ethics class is a unique environment, where interesting questions are given more thought than might otherwise be the case.  However, I found the extent to which this scenario was actually treated as a moral dilemma to be somewhat disturbing.  Some even went so far as to suggest that, morally speaking, there is no difference between killing the wolf to protect the child and simply allowing the child to be eaten by the wolf.  According to this view, both beings have equal value and the death of one would be equivalent to the death of the other.

In my opinion, this demonstrates the extent to which many, in entering the realm of philosophical discussion, actually seem to abandon the reality of experience, thereby rendering their ethical propositions meaningless.  To suggest that any human being would be justified in allowing any other human being (particularly a child) to be eaten by a wolf, so as to respect either the inherent value of the wolf or its natural right to predation, is a perfect example of why so many people are so contemptuous toward overly intellectualized ethical philosophy.  Any ethical standard that suggests the acceptability of such behavior could not possibly be taken seriously as a manner in which to live one’s life.

Perhaps it is speciesism (although in my last post I believe I demonstrated that there are many types of relationships/sentiments that hold significant moral relevance), but I believe absolutely every decent person would do anything they could to save the child.  Not only that, but anyone that stood by and watched, due to some hardline belief in the moral equality of all sentient creatures, would be looked at as a monster.  In this case, I believe that natural sentiments and social norms are entirely in the right, and the burden of proof lies with those who would suggest that a wolf is just as important as a human child.

I do understand that it was simply a hypothetical discussion, and I do not mean this as an attack on anyone personally.  Nor do I believe that anyone would actually refrain from saving a child from a wolf attack.  But that is essentially my point.  I think it is important, regardless of how ridiculous the hypothetical scenario may be, to keep ourselves grounded in the reality of actual experience when discussing morality.  Otherwise, I feel as though ethics loses its meaning.

Emotion Getting the Best of You

            Ideally, we like to think of ethics as somehow consisting only of rational arguments.  It generally brings about discomfort and distaste when anything smelling of sentiment comes into play.  Yet, as Brody’s argument points out, there are many cases where emotional bonds play very important roles in moral decisions. 

The parent/child relationship is an obvious case.  In fact, it is so obvious that in class it was suggested we discuss scenarios involving siblings instead (which almost seems to prove the point in the first place).  So, consider a drowning scenario where you have to choose between saving a stranger or a sibling (or even just a friend).  Is there really anyone that truly believes they would flip a coin so as to avoid any emotional bias from creeping into their ethical decision-making?  The fact is you are more emotionally attached to one person, and would automatically decide to save that person.  It is a purely sentimental decision that is so universally understandable that no one could ever blame someone for making it.  Any attempt to give a logical, philosophical explanation would just be a rationalization after the fact.

Extreme hypothetical scenarios aside, I suppose the point is that (much to the chagrin of many philosophers) human emotions and relationships will always play a significant role in moral decisions.  Rational argument is incredibly important.  It is a powerful check on the dubious nature of emotional behavior.  But we are emotional creatures, and will never be purely rational.  True, some feelings are toxic and dangerous, and should not be used to justify despicable behavior.  But some human sentiments (love, compassion, empathy, solidarity) are extraordinarily positive tools, and are arguably the basis for our desire to be moral in the first place.  To disregard these because they are not derived from rational thought processes seems like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

I do not necessarily agree with Brody’s discounting argument entirely, and I know that I have not mentioned animals at all.  It seems to me, however, that given a drowning scenario involving a human and a nonhuman animal, most people would save the human without thinking twice.  Instead of searching for some theoretical rationalization after the fact, Brody’s argument at least seems to acknowledge that this could be based solely on sentiment, and that does not necessarily make it wrong.  As to coming up with a particular discounting rate, or discussing how this relates to animal research is, perhaps, another issue.  

Response to Sebastian's "Factory vs. Family Farms"

            I am glad you brought this up because I think it is an important point.  The consumption of animal products is a very contentious topic that involves a great deal of interrelated issues.  One would be completely justified in pointing to factory farming, the environment, the economy, world hunger, or human health concerns when suggesting that people should become vegetarians.  All of these are very good reasons and, particularly when taken cumulatively, could be used to argue that vegetarianism is morally obligatory.

            However I do believe that these arguments are distinct from the basic argument that meat eating is wrong.  Although the issues are very much interrelated, I think it is important to distinguish between the basic argument and the complex web of correlating factors.  For instance, let’s say I visit my friend’s small family farm. They have recently slaughtered one of their cows, and offer me a hamburger for lunch.  In this case, I cannot rely on any of the previously mentioned issues, but must confront the basic question of whether or not killing this cow for food was wrong. 

            I know people have very strong feelings either way, and in this post I will stop short of taking a side.  I simply think it is important to recognize the distinction.  Arguments for vegetarianism based on concerns regarding factory farms, the environment, and world hunger are legitimate.  Yet debating the morality of meat eating is an important question in and of itself.  I think discussions could make more progress if the issues were recognized as connected, but still somewhat separate.