I agree that Cohen’s argument
(at least the excerpt that we read) seems to lead to the conclusion that human
beings who are not moral agents have no more value than trees, and therefore
have no rights. I also agree that the
most likely response to this criticism would entail the idea of potential, and that such an argument is
not entirely satisfying. However, I see
the problem slightly differently.
If you will allow me to put the abortion argument aside
(as I see your point and think it is a good one), I do think that the argument
from potentiality makes some sense in the case of human children. I do not think that knowledge of the future
is required in order to see the potential for moral agency as having value in
itself. The inherent value of a moral
agent is not dependent on them behaving morally, or whether their actions bring
about positive consequences. It is inherent in the fact that they possess
the requisite capacities. I see the
value associated with potential as similarly unconditional. Given that every moral agent was once a child
with nothing but the potential for
agency, it seems reasonable to suggest that they always had the inherent value, but
that the responsibility of agency came on gradually.
That being said, I agree that this argument only applies
to children who really do have the potential for moral agency. It says absolutely nothing about those human
beings who lack that potential, such as the mentally disabled. This is where Cohen’s argument is most
vulnerable. Although I think the
argument from potentiality would allow him to squeeze ordinary children into
his circle of friends, he would still essentially be arguing that the mentally
disabled (among others) have no rights.
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