I completely agree that the
fact that moral patients are incapable of reciprocity does not exempt us from
our moral responsibilities to them. In
fact, as Singer points out, reciprocity is in no way a strong foundation for
morality (43-44). What then would be our
moral responsibility in regards to the severely mentally disabled, or to future
generations? Although there are
certainly cases where they can overlap, morality and reciprocity are really two
different ideas. Perhaps I could reason
that because my friend picked me up from the airport, it would be wrong for me
not to return the favor. However,
picking a friend up at the airport would be the right thing to do regardless of
any need for reciprocity.
Indeed, lack reciprocity does not exempt us from engaging in a moral relationship with moral patients. However, I do propose that reciprocity is necessary to consider agents and patients of the same moral category, vested with the same moral rights. I use "relationship" above since I cannot account from where "responsibilities" would arise since the other cannot make any demands of us. In my opinion, if moral patients cannot make moral demands of us we owe them none. But, we can, and likely should, grant them the benefit of our moral agency based on a shared analogous inherent value.
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