Friday, January 25, 2013

Dog Overboard!


            At the very end of his discussion concerning animal rights, Tom Regan puts forth an interesting lifeboat scenario.  There are four adult humans and a dog in a lifeboat, but there is only room for four.  Regan argues that his rights view is consistent with our initial belief that the dog should be thrown overboard.  He justifies this by arguing that death would cause more harm to any one of the humans than it would to the dog.  The ease with which he seemed to draw this conclusion took me somewhat by surprise, given that he had just went to great lengths to convince the reader that all “subjects-of-a-life” have equal inherent value.  He specifically emphasizes that “subject-of-a-life” is a categorical distinction, “admitting of no degrees” (p.22).  How is it that the harm caused by death is not measured by the loss of one’s inherent value?
            Please do not misunderstand.  Although I confess I am a dog-lover, and it breaks my heart to even imagine this scenario, I am in full agreement that the dog should be thrown overboard.  I believe that human beings, due to the nature of our consciousness, have a distinctly more profound capacity for suffering, and for meaningful life in general.  To me, however, this suggests that inherent value does exist in varying degrees.  Although I would not know how to quantify it, I do place the value of a human life above that of a dog.

2 comments:

  1. Hi, Sean. I've responded to this post @ http://phil375h.blogspot.com/

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  2. I agree with both of you that it seems Regan's scenario seems rather contradictory to his beliefs. Not that I disagree with his stance on the given senario either, but the things he says do not seem to make much sense if you are a firm believer in what subject-of-a-life actually means. The idea of throwing the dog overboard because it would experience less pain than a human would seems to follow some utilitarian principles, while the idea of subject-of-a-life seems to be going against those principles. Given what we know about moral agents and patients, don't you think it may seem wrong to make a decision to take somethings life away just based on calculating (for the lack of a better word) the amount of pain dying inflicts on each being? Every living creature has inherent value. Regan's argument seems somewhat flawed due to the fact that one could use his own argument against him in the scenario he gives us at the end of the chapter.

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