Emotion Getting the Best of You

            Ideally, we like to think of ethics as somehow consisting only of rational arguments.  It generally brings about discomfort and distaste when anything smelling of sentiment comes into play.  Yet, as Brody’s argument points out, there are many cases where emotional bonds play very important roles in moral decisions. 

The parent/child relationship is an obvious case.  In fact, it is so obvious that in class it was suggested we discuss scenarios involving siblings instead (which almost seems to prove the point in the first place).  So, consider a drowning scenario where you have to choose between saving a stranger or a sibling (or even just a friend).  Is there really anyone that truly believes they would flip a coin so as to avoid any emotional bias from creeping into their ethical decision-making?  The fact is you are more emotionally attached to one person, and would automatically decide to save that person.  It is a purely sentimental decision that is so universally understandable that no one could ever blame someone for making it.  Any attempt to give a logical, philosophical explanation would just be a rationalization after the fact.

Extreme hypothetical scenarios aside, I suppose the point is that (much to the chagrin of many philosophers) human emotions and relationships will always play a significant role in moral decisions.  Rational argument is incredibly important.  It is a powerful check on the dubious nature of emotional behavior.  But we are emotional creatures, and will never be purely rational.  True, some feelings are toxic and dangerous, and should not be used to justify despicable behavior.  But some human sentiments (love, compassion, empathy, solidarity) are extraordinarily positive tools, and are arguably the basis for our desire to be moral in the first place.  To disregard these because they are not derived from rational thought processes seems like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

I do not necessarily agree with Brody’s discounting argument entirely, and I know that I have not mentioned animals at all.  It seems to me, however, that given a drowning scenario involving a human and a nonhuman animal, most people would save the human without thinking twice.  Instead of searching for some theoretical rationalization after the fact, Brody’s argument at least seems to acknowledge that this could be based solely on sentiment, and that does not necessarily make it wrong.  As to coming up with a particular discounting rate, or discussing how this relates to animal research is, perhaps, another issue.