The Right to Life

            It seems as though this pesky consciousness problem just refuses to go away.  Regarding the question of personhood, Part III of the text suggests that self-consciousness would be a minimum requirement.  Dennett goes so far as to say that one should be aware of the self-consciousness of others as well, but one could argue he is just looking for a way to single out human beings.  I found Cavalieri’s piece fairly persuasive.  It seems more than reasonable that any being who is actually aware of its own existence, “as a distinct entity” with a past and future, should have the right to life. 

            Given our previous discussions regarding inherent value, rights, and varying degrees of consciousness, however, is it right to draw the line determining the right to life at the capacity for self-consciousness?  If a being is simply conscious and capable of suffering, should they not also have the right to life?  Or would it be acceptable to say that they merely have the right not to suffer?  I think I will hold off from any rash judgments, my own opinions being completely up in the air at this point.  It does seem plausible that levels of consciousness should count for something, particularly self-consciousness.  However, I am not sure where I would draw any lines.